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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the language used in legal speech acts in legislative
texts in the field of English Contract Law as the object of study. It points to a
division of legal English in subdomains with ‘the language of the law’ as a parti-
cular sublanguage. Interest centers on regulative and constitutive functions, and
an analysis of realization patterns of directive acts is reported. The findings
show that the language of the law characteristically selects patterns of directives
which differ in level of directness from the patterns typically selected in eve-
ryday conversational English. This difference can be explained with reference to
“felicity conditions”.
l. Introduction
l.l Characteristics of legal English
Studies of legal language have been concerned in particular with outli-
ning the characteristics of legal English. There has been little compara-
tive work on legal language, and interest has centered almost exclusively
on syntactic and lexical features. Studies undertaken of the structural
properties of the register of legal English have labelled the style as
‘frozen’ due to formulaic structures which seem old-fashioned in modern
language use (for example, many contracts are not written afresh but
make use of old formulas). Furthermore, it is characterized by long sen-
tences (5O words on average), an impersonal style with many formulaic
expressions and typical legal vocabulary. Danet (l985, 278-87) provides
an overview of linguistic descriptions of the legal register, of which the
following is but a very brief summary.
An obvious object of study has been the lexicon of legal English.
Legal vocabulary exhibits distinctive lexical features particular to expres-
* This research has been financed partly by The Danish Research Council for the Humanities and I
would like to express my gratitude for their support.
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sing the concepts of law and, as a consequence, has been subjected to
analysis in a number of studies. Thus Danet (l985) has pointed to the fol-
lowing features as characteristic of the legal register: technical terms;
common terms with uncommon meanings; archaic expressions; doublets;
formal items; unusual prepositional phrases; a high frequency of any (see
pp. 279-8O for references and exemplification).
Syntactic complexity accounts for many of the difficulties lay persons
are confronted with in comprehending legal English. Sentence length and
sentence complexity seem to go together. Gustafsson (l975) reports an
average of 2.86 clauses per sentence, and typical syntactic features are
the prominent use of nominalizations (Crystal/Davy l969, Gustafsson
l983, Shuy/Larkin l978, Charrow/Charrow l979), and a high frequency of
passive constructions ((Sales et al. l977, Shuy/Larkin, l978, Charrow &
Charrow, l979). The use of complex conditionals was noted by Crystal &
Davy (l969), and a high incidence of prepositional phrases further com-
plicates the discourse (Charrow/Charrow, l979). A characteristic likely to
cause misunderstanding is the ommission of a wh-form plus some form
of the verb to be (‘whiz deletion’)as in the following example: agree-
ment…(which is) herein contained or implied) (Danet l980). Further
characteristics contributing to syntactic complexity comprise unique
determiners (such and said), impersonality, negatives (in particular doub-
le negatives) and binomial expressions.
It must be noted that the characteristics of legal English presented a-
bove derive from language use in writings in which the level of formality
can be characterized as frozen or formal. The texts examined comprise
legislative language, administrative and testament language, jury instru-
ctions, and documents such as endowment-assurance policies, hire-pur-
chase agreements, insurance policies. A different picture might emerge if
samples of legal English in the spoken medium were considered.
As regards distinctive lexical features, such as technical terms, archaic
expressions and common terms endowed with meanings specific to legal
usage, these features seem to be unique to legal language.
However, when it comes to comparing legal English with various
types of scientific English, the syntactic complexity of the former may
not be particularly noteworthy, syntactic complexity being a characteri-
stic of scientific language irrespective of the specific domain (Kurzon
l989,287). What sets off one domain from another need not be syntactic
criteria, although this is the field to which most researchers have turned
so far; it may be fruitful to look to other dimensions of linguistic science
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in order to point to distinctive features of legal language.
Danet (l98O, l983) has been concerned with prosodic features and pre-
sents evidence of assonance, alliteration, and phonemic contrast, and a
number of researchers have shown that legal documents conform to the
principle of end weight. One area which has been almost totally neglect-
ed in the study of legal writings is pragmatics. An analysis of discourse-
level features of legal discourse has hardly begun, but Danet (l985,285)
has pointed to cohesive devices as an obvious object of study. Further-
more, it would be useful to analyse the various domains of legal lan-
guage in terms of communicative functions (or rhetorical techniques, to
use the term of Trimble l985). As pointed out by Kurzon (ibid p. 288),
very little work has been done in this particular field. In this paper we
shall be looking at pragmatic aspects of one particular domain of legal
English, namely the language of the law. The statute will be viewed as a
communicative act, and an analysis is undertaken of the realization pat-
terns of directives, in one particular field (or subdomain), viz. the lan-
guage of English Contract Law.l
l.2 The language of the law
Language is central to human affairs, but it is particularly critical for
the purposes of the law. In fact, in a very basic sense, law would not exist
without language (Danet l985,273). There are two primary functions of
law; one is the ordering of human relations, the other the restoration of
social order when it breaks down (see, e.g. Danet l98O, l985). With
regard to the former, the function of the law is two-fold: regulative and
constitutive. Law defines relations and tells us which activities are per-
mitted and which are not; and by means of law, new relations are created
where none existed before (cf., e.g. marriage ceremonies).
With regard to the ‘restoration of social order’, we are concerned with
the way in which language is used to maintain justice in cases of conflict,
either between citizens (civil law) or between the individual and the state
(criminal law). This paper is concerned with the language used in ‘the
ordering of human relations’. As such it is concerned with a particular
kind of language (or style) used for the specific purpose of constructing
documents, of laying down the law, which, in a broad sense, includes
not only legislation, but also documents pertaining to private law, such as
1 A domain/subdomain may be specified with regard to, for example, type of law (Contract Law,
the Sale of Goods Act, etc.), as well as textual function (legislation, coutroom language, etc.)
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contracts, wills, and deeds. I shall refer to this language as the language
of the law, while I use legal language as a superordinate term to refer to
all uses of legal language.
The language of the law is to be distinguished from other types of
legal language, as, for example, the language used in the courtroom, the
language of legal textbooks, the language used to talk about the law
(‘law language’) in a formal, as well as an informal setting. See Figure l
below, in which legal English has been divided according to external
factors pertaining to the situation of use.
Figure l
This way of defining legal language and ‘language of the law’ is by no
means the only way of delimiting the two concepts. In fact, Kurzon
(l989,283-84) argues in favour of a twofold division, with the language
of the law as one part of language related to the legal domain, and legal
language referring to all types of languages used in legal contexts apart
from the language of the law, as the other. However, I view the language
of the law as part of legal language; furthermore, I find it useful to take a
more differentiated approach to what Kurzon (ibid) has classified as legal
language. Only with the specification of sub-domains can we begin to
look for characteristics specific to a particular legal sublanguage. For this
reason, I prefer to keep legal language as the cover term, and specify
each subdomain in turn. This position is adopted as a consequence of the
way in which I view language, viz. as constructed specifically to fulfill a
particular function in a specific communicative situation.
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l.3 The language of the law as an instance of LSP
As is apparent from the discussion above modern legal English has
become a highly differentiated variety of language, the specificity of
which has given rise to the question of whether it may be treated as a
separate dialect, register, or sublanguage. Charrow et al. (l982) believe
that the linguistic differentiation of legal English may be great enough to
justify this variety view, while Danet (l985) prefers to consider legal
English a special register, viewed in the light of Bolinger’s (l975) sug-
gestion that ‘register is mainly a matter of formality’. Outlining the levels
of formality (frozen, formal, consultative, and casual), Danet places legal
discourse towards the formal end of the scale. Frozen, written uses of
legal English comprise documents: insurance policies, contracts, wills,
etc.; frozen spoken genres include marriage ceremonies or witnesses’
oaths (to tell “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth”). For-
mal written legal English comprises the language found in statutes, law-
yers’ briefs and appellate opinions, and spoken language in lawyers’ exa-
minations of witnesses in trials, lawyers’ arguments in trials and expert
witnesses’ testimonies. Consultative style is restricted to lay witnesses’
testimonies, lawyer-client interaction and the like, whereas casual style is
found only in informal conversations, e.g. between judges and lawyers at
lobby conferences, lawyer-to-lawyer conversations out of earshot of their
clients, etc. (See Danet l98O,474-82, l985,275-277). In the present paper
it will be argued that legal language is a specific domain of Language for
Specific Purposes (LSP), which, in turn, can be divided into a number of
subdomains presumed to involve linguistic diversification. The language
of the law is viewed as one among several sublanguages of legal lan-
guage. As such my definition is seen within a conception of LSP which
views LSP as a range of domains which may be further divided into sub-
domains involving a number of sublanguages. This conception is in a-
greement with the East European conception of languages as coordinate
systems with a horizontal dimension involving the number of domains
into which language can be divided, e.g. scientific language, legal lan-
guage, language for economics, language for medicine, etc. and a vertical
dimension specifying a specific ‘layer’ of this domain. The latter dimen-
sion is defined according to sociological functions, and yields a number
of ‘functional styles’ (scientific, official, publicist, literary and colloquial
styles) (cf. Mikkelsen l99O,6), or it is specified along sender/receiver
constellations as preferred by Kalverkämper (cited in Kromann/Thom-
sen,l989). The horizontal/vertical distinction is represented in Figure 2.
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Figure 2
The framework to be suggested here differs in so far as I want to add a
further dimension relating to communicative function, so that the model
becomes at least three dimensional: domain/subdomain, communicative
function, sender/receiver constellation, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3
In order to specify sensibly the characteristics relating to a specific
sender/receiver relationship (e.g. expert to layman), the particular do-
main/subdomain in question must be delimited. The language, in turn,
varies according to the purpose of the communication. For example,
when a lawyer adresses a witness in court, the language to be used will
differ from the language to be used by a lawyer addressing a client, even
though in both cases he/she would be addressing a layman. When addres-
sing a client, the communicative intention could, for example, be one of
informing the client about aspects of the the law of inheritance, and
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giving him/her advice accordingly; it could be that of specifying a penal-
ty, collecting a debt, etc.; and, consequently, the rhetorical functions
would differ accordingly and involve either the written or the spoken
medium. Within the specific subdomain we must be concerned with the
function to which the language is put. The speaker’s/writer’s communi-
cative intention is decisive; the message to be conveyed is at the crux of
the matter, no matter what subdomain or sender/receiver relationship we
are concerned with.
Mikkelsen (ibid p. 5) admits that it is of course possible to work with
more than two parameters at a time, but doubts that this will be fruitful. It
is argued here that it is not only to the point, but that it is, in fact, neces-
sary to include the parameter of communicative function in the model in
order to be able to specify the criteria according to which the language
user can select the linguistic means for formulating a particular
message.2 The number of divisions to be made and functions to be speci-
fied will vary, though, according to the domain in question. With regard
to function, we anticipate regulative functions in legislative texts. In
contrast, we expect that legal textbooks will be informative, that coun-
sel/witness exchanges are likely to involve rhetorical techniques connect-
ed with argumentation, and that lawyer/client interaction will involve a
number of functions.
2. The enactment of the law — a declaration
Within pragmatics, language is not considered independently of the
uses to which it is put (see, e.g. Hymes l979), and non-linguistic ele-
ments of the real world play an important role in pragmatic theory or
description. Consequently, pragmatics is one of those areas in which
genuine interdiciplinary studies may be pursued (cf. Kurzon l986,l).
The importance of linguistic theory to the study of law has been recog-
nized by legal theorists and practitioners, for example, as a means to
improve lawyers’ understanding of the linguistic processes important to
law. Recently, attention has also been paid to speech act theory (e.g.
Kurzon l986). In fact, lawyers have in practice been aware of the rele-
vance of speech acts and of ‘performative verbs’3 for some time (e.g.
Hart l962, Olivecrona l97l).
2 Compare Halliday’s (l978) notions of field, tenor and mode).
3 A ‘performative verb’ signals the illocutionary force of an utterance, e.g. I (hereby) order you to
leave.
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In the following the laying down of the law will be considered in
terms of pragmatic theory, in particular within speech act theory as pro-
posed by Austin (l962), Searle (l969, l976), Habermas (l970).
This relation finds support in the etymology of the word. The word
‘act’ is derived from Latin ‘actum’ which means ‘thing done’ (OED).
‘Act’ may refer to a parliamentary act, a speech act, or any other act. To
avoid possible ambiguity, the word ‘act’ is used here to refer to speech
acts, whereas parliamentary acts are referred to as statutes.
In his classification of speech acts, Austin (l962) lists two classes of
speech acts as relevant to judicial acts, namely verdictives and exerci-
tives. Verdictives consist in the delivering of a finding upon evidence;
they are performed by judges and serve the purpose of maintaining justice
and restoring social order. As such, verdictives are concerned with
‘carrying out the law’, not with ‘laying down the law’.
Exercitives are defined by Austin as follows:
An exercitive is the giving of a decision in favour of or against a certain course
of action, or advocacy of it. It is a decision that something is to be so, as distinct
from a judgement that it is so: it is advocacy that it should be so, as opposed to
an estimate that it is so; … Its consequences may be that others are ‘compelled’
or ‘allowed’ or ‘not allowed’ to do certain acts. (Austin l962,l54)
Many of the verbs treated by Austin as illocutionary verbs of the class
of exercitives, e.g. permit, order, command, sanction, do in fact commit
the addressee to a course of action. They serve the function of ‘ordering
human relations’ and belong to the class of acts referred to by Searle
(l969) as directives, and by Habermas (l970) as regulatives. However, in
his class of exercitives, Austin also includes verbs such as enact, nomi-
nate, declare open, declare closed, which in the classification adopted by
Searle (l976) are given a status of their own in the class named declara-
tions.
As an attempt to explain the difference between classes which are evi-
dently similar in the sense that they both regulate people’s actions, I shall
relate to the notion of direction of fit introduced by Searle (l976).
‘Direction of fit’ refers to the way in which the utterance relates to
factors in the extralinguistic world. Some illocutions have as part of their
illocutionary point to get the words (more strictly — their propositional
content) to match the world, others to get the world to match the words
(Searle l976,3).
In representatives, the speaker tries to depict actual states in the world,
and the direction of fit is ‘words-to-world’. When issuing a directive, the
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speaker tries to influence the action of other people thereby changing the
world, so the direction of fit is ‘world-to-words’. Declarations also
attempt to get language to match the world. However, they do not
attempt to do so by describing an existing state of affairs (as do represen-
tatives), nor by trying to get someone to bring about a future state of af-
fairs (as do directives and commissives). The ‘peculiar relation’ in bring-
ing about the fit is brought about by the successful performance of the
declaration itself. In Searle’s formulation
Declarations bring about some alteration in the status or condition of the re-
ferred-to object or objects solely in virtue of the fact that the declaration has
been successfully performed. This feature of declarations distinguishes them
from the other categories. (Searle l976,l4)
When a declaration is properly performed (and only then), it brings
about a change of the world. To this end, the appropriate linguistic for-
mula must be used. A will written in the wrong formula is not a will at
all, and a marriage ceremony performed faultily is not “happy” (in Au-
stin’s and Searle’s sense of the word) (Danet l985,277). In addition, extra-
linguistic institutions must exist and the speaker and the hearer must
occupy special places within this institution.4 It is only on condition that
such institutions as the church, the law, private property, the state and a
special position of the speaker and the hearer within these institutions
exist that one can excommunicate, appoint, give and bequeath one’s pos-
sessions or declare war, and this can be done only by employing the
accepted formulas, e.g. I excommunicate you, I appoint you chairman
(see Searle l976,l4-l6).
When discussing the direction of fit, it was explained that representa-
tives could be characterized by being ‘words-to-world’, whereas the di-
rection of fit for directives was ‘world-to-words’. For declarations, the
direction of fit is both ‘words-to-world’ and ‘world-to-words’. If the acts
of excommunicating, appointing, etc. are successfully performed, the
people in question are excommunicated, appointed, etc. by the very
means of the performance of these acts. The purest form of a declaration
is ‘I/we (hereby) declare’ + proposition to the effect that ‘p is the case’.
Now let us turn to the act of ‘laying down the law’. When passing a
law, each statute is preceded by what is known as the enacting formula.
4 An exception (in fact the only one) to the principle that a declaration requires an extra-linguistic
institution for its successful performance is the subclass of declarations that concern language its-
elf, e.g. I define/ abbreviate/name/call/dub, etc. (Searle l976,l5).
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In Britain, the enacting formula, the so-called promulgation formula,
usually has the following form:
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice
and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present
Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: — (Minors’
Contract Act l987)
In speech act terms, the enacting formula, which is an explicit perfor-
mative containing the performative verb to enact, establishes the illocuti-
onary force of the whole text, viz. its macro-function (cf. the notion of a
‘master speech act’ employed by Fotion l97l). The promulgation formula
constitutes the performative part of the act, while the collection of rules
constitutes the propositional content.
In the above it has been pointed out that the successful enactment of
the law (by means of the promulgation formula) is a necessary condition
for ‘laying down the law’. In fact, this feature marks the act in question
as a declaration and is the condition on which a statute is effectuated. In
addition, each rule in the statute may, in turn, be considered an enactment




With regard to the regulating function, there is a hierarchical relationship
in legislative texts. As mentioned above, the promulgation formula
functions as a performative establishing the macro-function of the whole
text. Thereby, it controls the occurrence of other speech acts, which may
be acts of ‘ordering’ and ‘permitting’, but not, for example, acts of
‘expressing doubts/dislikes’ etc. Having defined the language of the law
as directive, we shall now consider the “nature” of the directive acts per-
formed in the collection of rules. A directive is an illocutionary act by
means of which the addresser tries to influence the behaviour of the
addressee. In ‘laying down the law’ rules are formulated with the intent
of ordering human relations. The adresser imposes a certain behaviour on
the adressee. Thus directives are impositive acts which have been defi-
ned as follows:
Impositive speech acts are described as speech acts performed by the speaker to
influence the intentional behaviour of the hearer in order to get the latter to per-
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form, primarily for the benefit of the speaker, the action directly specified or
indirectly suggested by the proposition. (Haverkate l984,lO7)
In legislation, a directive is not performed, though, for the benefit of
the speaker, but for “the common good”.
A directive is a face-threatening act involving a threat to the addres-
see’s negative face, which has been defined as “the want of every “com-
petent adult member” that his actions be unimpeded by others”
(Brown/Levinson l987). An addresser issuing a directive attempts to
exercise power or direct control over the intentional behaviour of the
adressee and in this way intrudes on the right to freedom of action.
The degree with which the addresser tries to impinge on the behaviour
of the adressee is referred to as the degree of imposition. In order to les-
sen the impact of the imposition on the addressee, the addresser has
recourse to politeness strategies. The explicitness with which the act to
be performed (or not performed in case of prohibitions) is referred to as
the directness level of the directive.
3.2 Directness levels of directive acts
When issuing a directive, various options are available to the addres-
ser. Within the theory of Brown/Levinson (ibid), the directive can be
expressed ‘off record’, i.e. with no explicit directive force, or ‘on record’,
i.e. with explicit directive force. In the case of the latter, the speaker can
voice the directive with or without face redress in terms of mitigating
devices. Table l (p. 76) gives a list of directives presented at levels of
increasing directness. In the case of unmodified imperatives and unhedged
performative utterances, the directive is phrased explicitly without face
redress and serves as an order. Likewise, modals like shall and must are
employed to impose a high degree of obligation on the adressee. Face-
redress, on the other hand, can be obtained by using conventionally indi-
rect directives, either in the form of ‘hearer-oriented’ questions concer-
ning the ability/willingness of the adressee to perform a certain action,
e.g. by employing the modals can/could, will/would, by ‘permission
statements’ (employing the modals may/might, can/could), or by ‘spea-
ker-based’ want-statements expressing the addresser’s desires and needs.
Finally, directives can be performed indirectly with no explicit marker of
the impositive intent (i.e. ‘off record’).
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Table 1
REQUEST STRATEGIES (presented at levels of increasing directness)
Situation: Speaker requests to borrow Hearer’s car.
I INDIRECT REQUESTS
1. Hints (mild) I have to be at the airport in half an hour.
(strong) My car has broken down.
Will you be using your car tonight?
II HEARER-BASED CONDITIONS
2. Ability Could you lend me your car?
Willingness Would you lend me your car?
Permission May I borrow your car?
3. Suggestory formulae How about lending me your car?
IIISPEAKER-BASED CONDITIONS
4. Statement of wishes I would like to borrow your car.
5. Statement of desires I want/need to borrow your car.
and need
IV DIRECT REQUESTS
6. Statement of obligation You must/have to lend me your car.
7. Performatives (hedged) I would like to ask you to lend me your car.
(unhedged) I ask/require you to lend me your car.
8. Imperatives Lend me your car.
9. Elliptical phrases Your car (please).
For previous classifications of directive strategies which build on Au-
stin and Searle’s theories, see Ervin-Tripp l976, House/Kasper l98l, Tros-
borg l987, Blum-Kulka/House/Kasper l989.
3.3 The data
The data of investigation have been drawn from a corpus of legal lan-
guage within the specific field of contract law comprising three individu-
al corpora (Danish-English-French).5 Each corpus consists of 3 x l m
running words and covers six types of text relevant to the subject: Sta-
tutes, rules and regulations, travaux préparatoires, judgements, contracts,
legal textbooks, articles in law journals. The data subjected to analysis
are the compiled statutes, rules and regulations:
– Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act l943
– Corporate Bodies’ Contracts Act l96O
5 The corpus has been compiled on the initiative of The Danish Research Council for the Humani-
ties to promote research activities in LSP and LSP communication.
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– Misrepresentation Act l967
– Unfair Contract Terms Act l977
– Minors’ Contracts Act l987.
For a more detailed description of the corpus, see Faber/Lauridsen
(forthcoming).
The use of directive acts in English Contract Law is compared to di-
rective acts utilized in everyday conversation. The latter data are part of a
corpus (36O conversations) elicited in a variety of social situations from
everyday life (private life, at work, at public places, etc.). For the present
purpose, the data were elicited by means of role play material construc-
ted on the basis of anticipated illocutionary acts with a directive function.
The participants were videotaped in dyadic face-to-face conversations
lasting approximately 5 minutes. The role relationships between the two
participants varied along two parameters: ‘dominance’ and ‘social di-
stance’. For further description of the data, see Trosborg l987.
4. The use of directive acts in English Contract Law
The corpus of legislative texts were analysed for the occurrence of
directive acts. Few performatives were used to indicate directive force.
Instead, modal auxiliaries were used as ‘implicit performatives’. The
results (see Table 2 below) show a predominance of direct acts (Cat. IV,
statements of obligation and prohibition), which amounted to 47.6% of
the total number of observed strategies. Unmarked strategies (Cat. I,
constitutive rules) were employed frequently (39.3%). In Cat. II , con-
ventionally indirect strategies, only permission statements were observed
(l3.l%), while strategies querying preparatory conditions (hearer’s abili-
ty/willingness) were noticeably absent. Speaker-based strategies expres-
sing wishes and desires (Cat. III) were not observed either. In the fol-
lowing, the realization types of directive strategies observed in the cor-
pus are discussed and exemplified.
4.l Direct strategies
As is apparent from Table 2, direct strategies (Cat. IV) are the most
frequently used directives in English Contract Law. Statements of obliga-
tion amounted to 34.5%, and prohibitions to ll.9%. Imperatives were not
observed at all, and only a few performatives were observed.
4.l.l Performative statements
As mentioned above, the initial enacting formula acts as a ‘performa-
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tive’ while the text itself functions as the proposition. In addition to the
enactment formula involving the verb enact, the performative verb re-
peal occurred as an explicit performative:
The Infants Relief Act l974 and the Betting and Loans (Infants) Act l892 are
hereby repealed (in accordance with section I of this Act) 
(Minor’s Contracts Act l987)
The verb declare may also be used as an explicit performative in Bri-
tish statutes, but in the present data this verb was not observed with per-
formative use. The verbs authorize, entitle and amend are used performa-
tively in American statutes (Kurzon l986,24). In British statutes, these
verbs do not hold the status of performatives, but they were observed in
the propositions of specific acts serving as constitutive rules. No perfor-
Table 2
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mative statements involving the performative verbs of ordering (order,
command, request, etc.) were observed.
4.l.2 Obligation
The modal shall typically expresses obligation in legal acts (2l.4%).
Shall is used to express the illocutionary force of an order. The addresser
— the legislature — instructs the adressee to do X. The addressee has no
choice but to obey:
Where a person has entered into a contract after misrepresentation has been
made to him by another party thereto and as a result he has suffered loss, then, if
the person making the misrepresentation would be so liable to damages in
respect thereof had the misrepresentation been made fraudulently, that person
shall be so liable not withstanding that the misrepresention was not made frau-
dulently, unless he proves that he had reasonable ground to believe and did be-
lieve up to the time the contract was made that the facts represented were true. 
(Misrepresentation Act l967)
All sums paid or payable to any party in pursuance of the contract before the
time when the parties were so discharged (in this act referred to as “the time of
discharge”), shall in the case of sums so paid, be recoverable from him as mo-
ney received by him for the use of the party by whom the sums were paid, and,
in the case of sums so payable, cease to be so payable:… 
(Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act l943)
In the examples above the modal verb shall has been employed to
state obligations of the court and of a party of the contract, respectively.
Note that the human party has been defocalized in the latter example
(All sums … shall … be recoverable from him).
The modal shall is also used widely in directives to state rules accor-
ding to which the law in question operates without mentioning an agent:
Nothing in this section shall be taken to prejudice any other remedy available to
the plaintiff. 
(Minors’ Contracts Act l987)
The use of the quasi-modal to be to is observed with a human agent:
Subject to this, it is for those claiming that a party does not deal as consumer to
show that he does not. 
(Unfair Contract Terms Act l977)
but this verb is employed most frequently with non-animate subjects, (cf.
the uses of shall employed in constitutive statements with non-human
subjects):
…goods are to be regarded as “in consumer use” when a person is using them,
or has them in his possession for use, otherwise than exclusively for the person
of a business; and…
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A contract term is to be taken — …
(Unfair Contract Terms Act l977)
The modals must and have to, which are typically used to express obli-
gation outside legal contexts, were rarely observed. In fact, directives
with must did not occur at all, and have to was only observed in the fol-
lowing example relating to ‘Effect of breach’:
Where for reliance upon it a contract term has to satisfy the requirement of rea-
sonableness, it may be found to do so… 
(Unfair Contract Terms Act l977)
The verbs ought to and should were rarely observed as illocutionary
force indicators of directives, which can be explained with reference to
the “weakness” with which obligation is expressed:
In relation to a notice (not being a notice having contractual effect), the require-
ment of reasonableness under this Act is that it should be fair and reasonable to
allow reliance on it, having regard to all the circumstances obtaining when the
liability arose or (but for the notice) would have arisen. 
(Unfair Contract Terms Act l977)
Moral duty, rather than legal obligation, is generally conveyed by the
two modals in question.
Past tense modals typically occur specifying the conditions under
which a given act holds, compare the use of could, should, and would in
the following example with shall signalling obligation:
Where by reference to a contract term or notice a person seeks to restrict liabili-
ty to a specified sum of money, and the question arises (under this or any other
Act) whether the term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness,
regard shall be had in particular (but without prejudice to subsection (2) above
in the case of contract terms) to — 
(a) the resources which he could expect to be available to him for the purpose of
meeting the liability should it arise; and
In a case where-… a person is not precluded by this Act from excluding or
restricting liability for loss or damage, being loss or damage for which the pro-
visions of the Convention would, if they had the force of law in relation to the
contract, impose liability on him.
(Unfair Contract Terms Act l977)
4.l.3 Prohibitions
In addition to statements expressing obligation the regulation of beha-
viour can take place by issuing prohibitions. Prohibitions indicated by
shall not occur with non-human subjects, as, for example, in the fol-
lowing statute relating to negligence liability:
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The following enactments shall not apply to any contract made by a minor after
the commencement of this Act — …
Where -…
the guarantee shall not for that reason alone be unenforceable against the gua-
rantor…
(Unfair Contract Terms Act l977)
or a human body is addresssed:
In considering whether any sum ought to be recovered or retained under the
foregoing provisions by any party to the contract, the court shall not take into
account any sums which…
(Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act l943)
While the modal verb may is typically used to indicate permission sta-
ting the rights of legal bodies and citizens (see below), the modal verb
can mostly occurs in negated form stating what cannot take place. These
acts are also included as they serve to regulate behaviour:
A person dealing as consumer cannot by reference to any contract term be made
to indemnify another person (whether a party to the contract or not) in respect of
liability that may be incurred by the other for negligence or breach of contract,
except in so far as the contract term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.
(Unfair Contract Terms Act l977)
Only in some cases are the parties of the contract explicitly mentioned.
In the remaining instances in the statute the statements occur in the pas-
sive form foregrounding a non-human object of legislation, as, for ex-
ample, ‘liability’ in the following example:
Liability for breach of the obligations arising under section 2 of the Supply of
Goods and Services Act l982 (implied terms about title etc in certain contracts
for the tranfer of property in goods) cannot be excluded or restricted by referen-
ces to any such term.
(Unfair Contract Terms Act l977)
4.2 Permission
Permission issues from some authority, which is often the speaker
(addresser) — the performer of the speech act. In legislation, the authori-
tative source is the legislature, which grants permission to the body in
question to perform a certain act; it does not order the body to do so (as
in the case of statements of obligation), but gives it discretion to do so.
Statements of permission may serve to establish the right of legal institu-
tions, such as the court, the arbitrator:
In estimating, for the purposes of the foregoing provisions of this section, the
amount of any expenses incurred by any party of the contract, the court may
without prejudice to the generality of the said provisions, include such sum as
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appears to be reasonable in respect of overhead expenses and in respect of any
work or services performed personally by the said party.
(Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act l943)
In the following example, note also the excessive number of condi-
tions to be fulfilled for the act to hold (where, if, ought to, would).
Where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has been
made to him otherwise than fraudently, and he would be entitled, by reason of
the misrepresentation, to rescind the contract, then, if it is claimed, in any pro-
ceedings arising out of the contract, that the contract ought to be or has been
rescinded the court or arbitrator may declare the contract subsisting and award
damages in lieu of rescission, if of opinion that it would be equitable to do so,
having regard to the nature of the misrepresentation and the loss that would be
caused by it if the contract were upheld, as well as to the loss that rescission
would cause to the other party.
(Misrepresentation Act l967)
Consider also an example involving delegated legislation:
For the purpose of subsection (3)(a), the values which shall be taken to be the
official values in the United Kingdom of the amounts (expressed in gold francs)
by reference to which liability under the provisions of the Convention is limited
shall be such amounts in sterling as the Secretary of State may from time to
time by order made by statutory instrument specify.
(Unfair Contract Terms Act l977)
In the following, permission extends to the rights to set up contracts
which need not be under seal:
l Cases where contracts need not be under seal
(l) Contracts may be made on behalf of any body corporate, wherever incorpo-
rated, as follows: -
(a) a contract which if made between private persons would be by law required
to be in writing, signed by the parties to be charged therewith may be made on
behalf of the body corporate in writing signed by any person acting under its
authority, express or implied, and
(b) a contract which if made between private persons would by law be valid al-
though made by parol only, and not reduced into writing, may be made by parol
on behalf of the body corporate by any person acting under its authority, express
or implied.
(Corporate Bodies’ Contracts Act l960)
Statements of permission only amounted to l3.l% of the total number
of observed directives.
4.3 Constitutive rules without directive markers
Statements which do no include performative verbs, or modals which
function as implicit performatives, may still serve the purpose of laying
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down the law. Sentences used to explain or define expressions and words
in the statute or to supply information concerning the application of the
statute, or part of it, are part of constitutive rules (cf. Kurzon l986,23).
Examples typically involve verbs such as to apply, to extend, to mean, to
affect, which are not performative verbs. Statements with the verbs
impose, purport to, include, exclude, fall within, come into force, etc.,
were also observed as verbs of constitutive statements. Some examples
are given below:
In the case of both contract and tort, sections 2 and 7 apply (except where the
contrary is stated in section 6(4)) only to business liability, that is liability for
breach of obligations or duties arising -…
The liabilities referred to in this section are not only the business liabilities de-
fined by section l(3), but also include those arising under any contract of sale of
goods or hire-purchase agreement.
A person is not bound by any contract term prejudicing or taking away rights of
his which arise under, or in connection with the performance of, another con-
tract, so far as those rights extend to the enforcement of another liability which
this Part of this Act prevents that other from excluding or restricting.
Nothing in this Act removes or restricts the effect of, or prevents reliance upon
any contractual provision which -
(a) is authorized or required by the express terms or necessary implications of
an enactment, or
(b) being made with a view to compliance…
(Unfair Contract Terms Act l977)
This Act extends to England and Wales only.
(Minors’ Contracts Act l987)
A constitutive rule without performative marking (explicit or implicit)
was the single strategy which was used most frequently (39.3%).
5. A comparison with the use of directives in everyday 
conversations
When comparing the directives observed in Enghlish Contract Law
with directives as observed in everyday conversations (see above for a
description of the conversational data), it is obvious that the selection of
directness levels differs markedly in the two domains. Figure 4 below
presents the results for the four main categories of directives subjected to
analysis.
The strategies used most frequently in everyday conversational Eng-
lish belong to the category of conventionally indirect directives. This fin-
ding is in agreement with the findings of previous studies (see, e.g.
Ervin-Tripp l976 (American English), and House/Kasper l98l, Blum-
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Kulka/House/Kasper l989 (British and American English)). Querying the
hearer’s ability/willingness to perform a given act (Could you spare me
a cigarette?/Would you mind mailing this package for me?) amounts to
5O.6% of the total number of strategies, while statements of the speak-
er’s wishes and desires (I would like you to send me a parts list) amount
to l6.9%, altogether comprising 67.5% of the total number of strategies.
These strategies do not occur as directives in contract law. Within this
category, the language of the law employs statements of permission,
though only with a frequency of l3.l%.
In contrast, the most frequent category in the language of the law is
direct ordering (47.6%), which is the category employed least frequently
in the conversational data (9.6%). As for individual strategies, statements
employing the modal verb shall is specific to legal English. In contrast,
imperatives were not observed at all in the language of the law. In eve-
ryday conversation, orders are issued downward in rank by means of
imperatives (Bring me the file), or the strategy is used as an indicator of
Figure 4
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solidarity between interactants of equal status (Hand me the paper, will
you?).
The modal must (deontic use) was not observed at all as illocutionary
force indicator of a directive. Must is used in conversational English in
directives issued by authority figures, and it also occurs in statements in
which the speaker wants to expresss enthusiam as to the realization of the
propositional content (You really must go and see that film). The modals
should/ought to were utilized only in rare cases where a directive was
intentionally weakened.
The occurrence of statements with directive intention without perfor-
mative marking constituted part of the data in both domains (22.9% in
everyday conversations, 39.3% in the language of the law).
5.l Explaining the findings
The observed differences in the use of directives in English Contract
Law compared to the use in conversational English may be ascribed to a
difference between the written and the spoken medium. However, on the
one hand, samples of directives in written English (a corpus of business
letters) also shows a predominance of conventionally indirect strategies
(Pilegaard l990), while, on the other hand, the very direct strategy of
commands issued by means of imperatives is observed in conversational
English, but not in the language of legislative texts.
A consideration of the “felicity conditions” of directives is helpful in
throwing light on the uses of directives in the language of the law. Direc-
tives cannot be ‘true or false’, as is the case for representatives; instead
they may be ‘felicitous’ or ‘infelicitous’. Searle (l969,64-66) has outlined
the following conditions pertaining to the successful performance of a
command, which is similar in terms of felicity conditions to an enact-
ment (cf. Kurzon l986,8):
conditions
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The ‘preparatory condition’ a) is of little relevance to the enactment of
the law, as the legislature would only enact laws that the adressees are
capable of obeying. In acting otherwise, the law would become a “dead”
letter (Kurzon l986,l5). Hence, the total lack of strategies querying a pre-
paratory condition. Neither is the legislature concerned with the addres-
see’s willingness to perform according to the law. The authority of the
legislature is unquestionable. These factors explain why we do not find
directives of the kind Can/could/would you do X? in the corpus. This
type of directive is by far the most frequent in conversational usage, due
to a balance between being adequately polite (conventional indirectness),
and a demand for explicitness (the proposition to be performed by the
adressee is explicitly stated).
As for condition b), the legislature would not legislate on matters that
the adressees would do anyway, such as natural activities (e.g. sleeping,
eating) (Kurzon l986,l5).
The total absence in the language of the law of want-statements (the
speaker’s wishes and desires for X to take place), which in conversation
is realized as I want/would like X can be explained with reference to the
‘sincerity condition’. This strategy is a statement to the effect that the
speaker sincerely wants X to take place. However, as the legislator’s
demands become law, when enacted, there is no point in stating sincerity.
The condition of particular relevance to legislation is condition c) au-
thority. The legislator is in a position of authority over the addressee,
which factor is decisive in the selection of directness levels utilized in the
language of the law. It explains the high proportion of direct acts and
may even influence acts seemingly offering the addresse freedom of ac-
tion.
As regards the examples above employing the modals may/shall, the
modal verb may has been pointed out as indicating the illocutionary force
of a permission, while acts employing the modal verb shall were treated
as having the illocutionary force of orders. Legal writers have stressed
the need to distinguish between the two modals of legal language —
shall to be used with ‘mandatory’ and may with ‘directory’ force (Craies
l97l,229-230), that is shall implies obligation or duty and may implies
permission.
However, the illocutionary forces of order and of permission have in
common an authoritative source — the legislature. As pointed out by
Kurzon (l985,23), once an authorized body, such as a court, has been
given power by the occurrence of may to effectuate the legal rights of a
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person or class of persons, it is very difficult for it not to exercise that
power.
The distinction between may and shall may also be neutralized in eve-
ryday language, e.g. a manager may tell one of her employees to leave
her office by saying You may leave now, in which case the manager’s
wish is to be understood as a command.
The lack of imperatives in legislative texts may be due to the distance
between the legislature and the body of addressees, who are never di-
rectly addressed. In the case of the citizens, this may be due to the inter-
vention of mediators (as interpreters of the law to laymen). When addres-
sing legal bodies, lack of imperatives may be interpreted as adherence to
the principle of face-saving.
Finally, the occurrence of statements with directive intention without
performative marking observed in both conversational English and Eng-
lish contract law needs to be commented on. In the conversational data,
these utterances are indirect directives (hints), in the sense that the inten-
ded directive force can be neglected by a non-cooperative hearer. This is
not so with the unmarked statements of the language of the law. In spite
of the lack of directive markers, these statements belong to the body of
rules which come into function as directives by means of the promulga-
tion formula; hence they function as impositive acts on a par with expli-
cit directives.
5.2 The use of politeness markers
In everyday conversations, the illocutionary force of directives are
often hedged or mitigated by the inclusion of politeness markers (I won-
der if you could possibly…). In the language of the law, mitigators are
almost absent. However, one device, which has been observed to occur
frequently, is defocalization of agent as well as patient. A preliminary
analysis has shown that only l9.4% of the observed directives in contract
law have a human subject. Depersonalization is one way of mitigating
the impact of a directive on the addressee, as in such sum shall be reco-
verable, regard shall be had. Another reason for the high number of di-
rectives employing a non-human subject is the fact that the law operates
laying down its own constitutive rules with legal actants as subjects, such
as ‘this act’, ‘the provisions of this section’, ‘a statutory instrument’, ‘the




This paper has analysed the occurrence of legal speech acts in English
Contract Law. It has pointed to declarations by means of the enactment
formula as being unique to legislative texts. Furthermore, an analysis has
been presented of directive acts observed in the corpus revealing the
communicative acts of statements of obligation, statements of prohibiti-
on, statements of permission, as well as constitutive statements as direc-
tive acts typical of the language of the law.
When comparing the observed directives to directives observed in eve-
ryday conversations, it has been shown that the selection patterns, drawn
from a continuum of directness levels, differ. Legislative texts of English
Contract Law show a predominance of direct strategies (statements of
obligation and prohibition), whereas conversational English favours con-
ventionally indirect strategies.
It was argued that this difference could be ascribed to the external fac-
tors of the social situation, rather than to a difference in medium (written
vs. spoken). Furthermore, it is not just a matter of English language of
the law being more direct than conversational English (no imperatives
were observed); it is a question of selecting strategies to express a speci-
fic communicative function in a particular sender/receiver relationship
within the considerations of the “felicity conditions” of the act in ques-
tion.
This paper is but a preliminary step towards a pragmatic analysis of
legal language, and the comparison to conversational English is admit-
tedly very crude. Future studies may be concerned with the analysis of
communicative functions within various domains of legal English (to
specify the characteristics of a specific sublanguage), just as comparative
studies across domains and sender/receiver relationships, and across lan-
guages as well, are needed.
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